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Abstract
This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary scholarly assessments
of President Donald J. Trump’s appeals to rage, malice, and revenge by sketching the rhetorical dimensions of an underlying emotional-moral framework
in which victimization, resentment, and revenge are inverted civic virtues. I
elaborate on the concept of ressentiment (re-sentiment), a condition in which
a subject is addled by rage and envy yet remains impotent, subjugated and
unable to act on or adequately express frustration. Though anger and resentment capture part of Trump’s aﬀective register, I suggest that ressentiment accounts for the unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serving morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and ruminations on
past injuries. Thus, shifting focus from the rhetoric of resentment to that of
ressentiment explains how Trump is able to sustain the aﬀective charge of animus without forfeiting the moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s
“oppressors”— Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adversaries, welfare recipients, the Me Too movement, “globalists,” and racial Others.
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At a June 27 2017 rally in Youngstown, OH, President Donald J.
Trump delivered a message to his supporters about, among other
things, the state of US Immigrant and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
eﬀorts to combat criminal gangs who have illegally entered the country. In this address, Trump assured his audience that the state has, in
their name, taken revenge on the nation’s enemies. He boasted:
We have tough people. Our people are tougher than their people.
Our people are tougher and stronger and meaner and smarter
than the gangs. One by one we are ﬁnding the illegal gang members, drug dealers, thieves, robbers, criminals and killers. And we
are sending them the hell back home where they came from. And
once they are gone, we will never let them back in. Believe me. The
predators and criminal aliens who poison our communities with
drugs and prey on innocent young people, these beautiful, beautiful, innocent young people will, will ﬁnd no safe haven anywhere
in our country. And you’ve seen the stories about some of these
animals. They don’t want to use guns, because it’s too fast and it’s
not painful enough. So they’ll take a young, beautiful girl, 16, 15,
and others and they slice them and dice them with a knife because
they want them to go through excruciating pain before they die.
And these are the animals that we’ve been protecting for so long.1

In this passage we can observe familiar oscillations between toughness and vulnerability that are characteristic of Trump’s political style.
On the one hand, the nation is great on account of its spectacular capacity to revisit and inﬂict pain on others. Indeed, Trump’s newly
hardened America is “mean” and “tough.” The nation is no longer
complacent to be victimized by uncivilized “animals” and “predators.”
Trump takes credit for liberating besieged communities across the nation and making America safe from drugs and criminal violence.
On the other hand, the nation is also personiﬁed as a vulnerable
adolescent girl who has been subjected to senseless torture by a cruel
and implicitly racialized foreign enemy. In contrast to the nation’s cold
demeanor and newly developed musculature stands a competing national icon of innocence, passivity, and vulnerable femininity who,
when contrasted against the brutality of foreign Others, reinforces a
paradoxical sentiment that the citizenry is at once powerful and agentless. Although this message seems incoherent, what uniﬁes tropes of
toughness and vulnerability is an underlying presumption of a moral
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order that is validated by the perpetual existence of a hostile external
world. As such, Trump oﬀers his audience an emotional-moral framework in which feelings and aﬀects such as anger, rage, malice, and
revenge are never at rest and no one act of vengeance can dissipate
the nation’s desire for more. The message sustains an aﬀective charge
by addressing intractable enemies with vague and ill-conceived objectives. The audience is caught in the perpetual liminality between
defeat and triumph. By positioning his audience as powerless yet invulnerable, Trump can continue to go back to a renewable reserve of
anger and bitterness to warrant cruelty against an ever-growing list
of national enemies.
This essay contributes to and reframes the preliminary scholarly assessments of Trump’s appeals to rage, malice, and revenge by
sketching the rhetorical dimensions of an underlying emotional-moral
framework in which victimization, resentment, and revenge are civic
virtues. Rhetorical scholars who have examined Trump’s speeches,
rallies, and tweets have found a number of recurring patterns that
unhinge his supporters from taken-for-granted political conventions
and unburdens them from civic virtue. For instance, Brian L. Ott and
Greg Dickinson argue that Trump’s rhetoric can best be understood
as an extension of fears about the decentering of white masculinity,
the vitriolic norms of social networking, and the decline of professional journalism.2 Political appeals to white rage are not new, but
they suggest that Trump’s style, or manner of delivery, is particularly
well-suited to a warped media culture that encourages simplicity, impulsivity, cruelty, and narcissism. Although Trump routinely lies and
contradicts himself, Paul Johnson has argued that Trump’s incoherent vacillations between strength and victimhood enable his white audiences to disavow hegemonic whiteness and align themselves with
a marginalized, politically-exiled subjectivity.3 Trump, he argues, reframes his audiences’ generalized sense of human vulnerability as if
it were the experience of structural racial oppression. Marginalization in the form of reverse discrimination and unfair treatment frees
his supporters of any kind of debt or civic obligation to a seemingly
cruel and hostile polity.
Likewise, Robert E. Terrill has argued that Trump unburdens his
supporters of all social obligations that might otherwise constrain
the pursuit of their self-interest.4 Chief among these obligations are
empathy, equality, and other democratic virtues which demand that
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citizens acknowledge the burdensome legacy of racism that continues to preclude a truly democratic public culture. Joshua Gunn adds
that Trump’s political style is perverse, meaning that he is aware of
these social conventions but he violates them anyway.5 His constant
disavowals, his reliance on paralepsis and occultatio, his transgressions, his denial of consensus reality, are all underwritten by a perverse form of enjoyment that frees his supporters from legal, rhetorical, and psychic strictures.
Other rhetorical scholars have attended to the political and emotional environment that created the conditions for Trump’s civic transgressions. Mary E. Stuckey suggests that Trump’s hyperboles and disavowals are eﬀective because they speak to a highly-charged “aﬀective
environment” in which political rhetoric is “unmoored from its institutional routines.”6 Trump’s rhetoric is “aimed at the viscera,” meaning that institutionalized conventions and common virtues have lost
their symbolic eﬃciency on account of the electorate’s oscillating disillusionment with public institutions.7 Thought of this way, Trump’s
rhetoric is not unique to this moment; yet his extraordinary transgressiveness makes visible and helps scholars account for the textual and
contextual shifts that might animate his supporters. Indeed, Trump
mobilizes aﬀects and emotions to match, if not supersede, the tenor
of his ideological directives. Scholars such as Kendall R. Phillips, Marina Levina, and Kumarini Silva take a slightly diﬀerent approach by
speciﬁcally addressing the subject of Trump’s expressions of cruelty,
observing how the changing aﬀective structures in American life have
shifted so as to accommodate hatred and rage as acceptable expressions of the political.8 Consider how the transformations in media,
including the narrowcasting and fabrication of political information
alongside the vitriol of talk radio, social media platforms, and reality
television have created a welcoming environment for discourses underwritten by divisiveness and cruelty.9 Denise M. Bostdorﬀ takes on
the subject of anger directly, arguing similarly that while Trump does
not oﬀer coherent arguments he does provide an intelligible emotional
framework for his supporters that is both attuned to these shifts in
the aﬀective environment as well as the ways his audience is to remain in a state of perpetual anger.10
Trump, as Bostdorﬀ notes, nonetheless faces a series of rhetorical
challenges, two of which are of central concern to this essay. First,
Trump and his supporters have to reconcile their electoral victories
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with their claims of political exile. Second, anger “can be exhausting
and, once anger dissipates among the majority who are not dedicated
true believers, the thirst for revenge can dissipate, too.”11 This essay
addresses these two obstacles by reframing how Trump transforms
short-lived yet intense emotions such as anger, along with paradoxical
investments in the concept of white victimhood, into nearly inexhaustible rhetorical resources. Taken together, I argue that Trump’s claims
of victimhood and anger-laden calls for revenge seek out what philosopher Max Scheler called “the man [sic] of ressentiment,” or an audience who is seething with righteous anger and envy yet also suﬀering
from the impotence to act or adequately express frustration.12
Though anger and resentment capture part of Trump’s aﬀective
register, this essay suggests that the concept ressentiment accounts
for the unique intersection where powerful sentiments and self-serving morality are coupled with feelings of powerlessness and ruminations on past injuries. Whereas resentment can be characterized as bitter indignation that one has been treated unfairly, ressentiment is a
“self-poisoning of the mind” in which a subject is consumed by emotions and aﬀects such as “revenge, hatred, malice, envy, the impulse
to detract, and spite.”13 Although both are reactive impulses, emotions are often formed against deﬁnite objects and can be satiated
by speciﬁc ideologically guided actions. Indeed, one of Trump’s challenges is sustaining the aﬀective charge of revenge without dissipating the felt need for vengeance. Here, it is the impulse underlying the
desire to detract or seek revenge that matters. Thus, I argue that ressentiment functions as a generative force—providing a link between
emotions, ideology, and collective identity —that sustains the aﬀective
charge of detraction and revenge. My goal is to reframe Trump’s constant detractions, disavowals, and impulse to revel in pain as parts
of a broader emotional-moral framework that seeks to constantly regenerate the felt intensities that underwrite demands for revenge and
lamentations of victimhood.
Ressentiment: an emotional-moral framework
When Donald J. Trump accepted the Republican nomination for
president, he hailed an audience of angry yet noble suﬀerers—the forgotten, the downtrodden, the discarded, and the subjugated. He declared with ﬁery incredulity:
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Every day I wake up determined to deliver for the people I have
met all across this nation that have been neglected, ignored, and
abandoned. I have visited the laid-oﬀ factory workers, and the
communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals. These
are the forgotten men and women of our country. People who work
hard but no longer have a voice. I AM YOUR VOICE!14

Foregoing optimism and praise of the American character, Trump’s
RNC address portrayed America as an apocalyptic wasteland strewn
with the wreckage of abandoned factories and corroding infrastructure—held hostage and humiliated by a foreign occupying army of
criminal gangs, illegal immigrants, and foreign competitors. Though
doom is more typical of non-incumbent candidates, political commentator Paul Begala playfully referenced President Reagan’s 1984 campaign advertisement “Morning in America” to characterize Trump’s
darker take as “midnight in America.”15 Of course, these themes are
familiar to those who study populist rhetoric, for its many manifestations consistently feature a virtuous people facing oﬀ against “fat
cats” and powerbrokers.16 Yet, in Trump’s rhetoric, “the people” are
substantially narrowed to a very particular cultural ﬁgure who might
consider themselves aggrieved, grudge-holding, treated unfairly, powerless, and humiliated by economic misfortune and other global forces
outside of their control.
As Johnson, Ott and Dickinson, and Terrill have illustrated, Trump’s
demagoguery targets white Americans who feel anxious and victimized by their impending displacement as the nation’s demographic majority. But we can discern other characteristics about Trump’s imagined audience as well, or to use Edwin Black’s words, that which he
“would have his real auditor become.”17 Simply put: Trump’s imagined
audience is angry. They are angry because they suﬀer. They suﬀer because they are powerless. They are powerless because they are virtuous. The country, they are told, has been unfairly taken from them. It
is not simply that Trump intones resentment and rage but that he invites his audience to see themselves as powerless and incapable of adequately expressing their own frustrations. It is the suturing together
of powerful feelings with a morally righteous subject position of weakness that constitutes the political subject of ressentiment. With either
power or ability to articulate their own desires, Trump demands to
be his supporter’s surrogate: “I AM YOUR VOICE!”
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Although each concept summons common sentiments, there are important analytical distinctions between ressentiment and resentment
that help explain how Trump turns animus into a nearly inexhaustible resource. While ressentiment is often the province of philosophy,
psychoanalysis, and trauma studies, resentment is a term familiar to
rhetoricians on account of its relationship with pathos. In his genealogy of the concept, Jeremey Engels argues that resentment retains
a dual character in U.S. democratic culture, representing misdirected
enmity and hatred, on the one hand, and righteous indignation in the
pursuit of social justice, on the other.18 Engels traces rhetoric’s uneasy relationship with the concept starting from antiquity. He ﬁnds
that Aristotle found resentment to be an ungovernable emotion—an
undeniably negative civic feeling.19 Indeed, Isocrates feared that democratic resentment would sow violence and discontent amongst the
poor and might precipitate violence against the wealthy elites.20 Engels contends that “the philosophers of the classical period conceptualized resentment as a bitter, eruptive, undigniﬁed force that has to be
contained.”21 Yet, at their best, democracies are supposed to temper,
manage, and channel the vicissitudes of resentment into passionate
advocacy for the common good. Explaining the present forces of enmity, he avers that “much of the resentment felt today is the product
of widespread feelings of powerlessness in the populous, along with
the general sentiment that citizens are victims to forces and changes
beyond their control.”22 Although I agree with this argument, I would
add that the way Trump addresses his electorate places stress on the
elasticity of democratic norms to eﬀectively manage resentment toward existing political institutions. He does so not by channeling resentment alone but instead by suturing such sentiments to a moral
framework and an identity formation in which suﬀering and revenge
are inverted democratic virtues. And though resentment is the byproduct of feelings of powerlessness, Trump’s unique take on victimhood requires the persistence of a hostile external world to validate
his claims to marginality—even as he continually boasts about his victories. Indeed, as I have argued, the therapeutic function of white victimization rhetoric also belies any material standard by which claims
of racial and economic injustice are to be adjudicated.23
Ressentiment, then, captures the socially expressed state of mind,
the ethical stance, and collective identity sought out by a form of
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political rhetoric that links white victimization with virtue. If being
a victim is the price of entry to his political ethos, then Trump must
continually ruminate on his injuries, invent new tormentors and resurrect old ones, pursue ill-conceived policy goals, and perpetually defer the resolution of their collective grievances. The suﬀering of his
electorate takes precedence above all other considerations of justice.
The thirst for revenge never dissipates. Thus, shifting focus from
the rhetoric of resentment to that of ressentiment, I argue, explains
how Trump is able to sustain the charge of animus without forfeiting the moral high ground of victimhood to his audience’s “oppressors”—Democrats, the press, criminals, immigrants, foreign adversaries, welfare recipients, the #MeToo movement, “globalists,” and
racial Others. He can, therefore, exercise power on behalf of his electorate without giving up his claim to the moral and emotional indignation of the weak.
A rhetoric of ressentiment engenders both moral and aﬀective attachments that invite subjects to ruminate on their wounds—real or
perceived. The wound, in turn, becomes the source of the subject’s
political identity. Friedrich Nietzsche argues ressentiment is an emotional-moral framework in which the virtues of good and evil are reversed Where one is incapable of living up to a commonly agreed upon
system of morality, ressentiment manifests in a reactive and inverted
sense of virtue where one’s incapacity to act leads them to detract and
devalue common virtues that are otherwise praiseworthy. For those
aﬄicted, he writes, the wretched alone are the good; the suﬀering,
deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone – and you the powerful and noble are on the
contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless of
all eternity.25
Although Nietzsche problematically characterizes ressentiment
in terms of “slave morality,” this essay approaches ressentiment as
a perversion of morality that leads subjects to mistakenly slander
the common good as if their failure to embody such virtues represented structural oppression and thus justiﬁed their disavowal of civic
responsibility.26
Scheler elaborates by using the Aesop’s fable of the fox and the
grapes to explain how ressentiment inverts common virtue.27 The fox,
unable to reach the sweet grapes, attempts to save face by declaring them sour. In other words, when denied a desired social good or
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unable to perform a high civic virtue, the subject of ressentiment detracts and devalues those goods rather than acknowledge their conventionally accepted value. Ressentiment arises if emotions are powerful but must be suppressed because they are coupled with the feeling
that one is unable to act them out. This subject “tends to see injurious
intentions in all kinds of perfectly innocent actions and remarks of
others. Great touchiness is indeed frequently a symptom of a vengeful
character.”28 Put another way, “injury is experienced as destiny.”29 Ressentiment is a peculiar aﬀect because speciﬁc acts “cause no satisfaction—they merely cause discontent, for they destroy the growing pleasure aﬀorded by invective and negation.”30 Even where vengeance is
fully achieved, enemies are eﬀectively dispatched, and material power
relations are reversed, ressentiment nonetheless engenders a fundamental lack that remains a well spring of hatred and envy. Moreover,
their fantasies of power must be kept at a distance if they are to sustain the valorization and enjoyment of their invective.31
In this framework, past injuries become central to the subject’s identity in the present. Where personal and collective identity hinge on the
existence of hostile external world, a rhetoric of ressentiment seeks
to cultivate investment and attachment to one’s own subjugation. For
instance, Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” presumes an injury that must be overcome by restoring the subject to an
imagined yet indeterminate time in which they were putatively whole.
Thus, the identity constituted through the rhetoric of ressentiment is
melancholic in that it continually revisits past injuries without adequately mourning them. According to Freud, the melancholic subject
cannot move forward because they compulsively re-experience the past
as if it were happening in the present.32 Accordingly, Trump invites his
audience to both ruminate on past injuries and idealize an indeterminate time when they were un-fragmented subjects. But, as Barbara A.
Biesecker argues, melancholia stages “the loss of an impossible object,
ideal, or relation that the subject never had.”33 The temporal relation
engendered by “again” is a conduit to an object that the subject never
possessed and, thus, is a constitutive fantasy of the nation’s “greatness.”
For this reason, Trump’s rhetoric evokes trauma; but this is a trauma
that also concerns an object never lost, or those privileges neither revoked nor renounced by his white audience.34 Trump, however, levels
all experiences of white vulnerability as traumatic, particularly in his
hyperbolic characterization of daily violence in America.
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Working from the French translation of resentment (ressentir), I
wish to draw attention to the role of ressentiment in cultural politics
of melancholia.35 Here we might characterize ressentiment as a pattern of feeling in which a subject continually re-experiences a memory of a past or imagined sentiment, an injury or open psychic wound.
Søren Kierkegaard surmised that “just as air in a sealed space becomes
poisonous, so the imprisonment of reﬂection develops a culpable ressentiment if it is not ventilated by action or incident of any kind.”36
Ressentiment is an impediment to moving forward because it directs
the subject’s gaze backwards, tethering the self to ruminations of past
injuries. Wendy Brown suggests that such ruminations forge identities that make the past necessarily unredeemable.37 For Sarah Ahmed,
the fetishization of wounds has the tendency to excise past injuries
from history and fold them into the psyche.38 Complicating matters
further, white victimhood rhetoric is largely unconcerned with adjudicating the structural nature of injustice. The long-standing eﬀort to
paint white Americans, white men in particular, as victims erases the
material distinction between real structural inequality and indignation that arises from felt intensities.39
The insight oﬀered by a concept such as ressentiment is that it captures the conﬂuence between emotions, aﬀects, morality, and identity
that seem to have reached a crescendo at the outset of the Trump presidency. The nascent rhetorical scholarship on Trump would beneﬁt
from theoretical consonance between public shared emotions and
modes of moral judgment that are co-constituted in contemporary
rhetoric of the presidency. I characterize ressentiment as a phenomenon caught up in the entanglements between emotions, ideology, and
aﬃliation. Indeed, though Aristotle suggests that the tendency of anger is toward action (revenge), when it is enveloped by moral framework of victimhood, anger is instead committed to the audience’s disempowerment. A rhetorical theory of ressentiment accounts for the
parsimony between Trump’s ideological discourse and emotional entailments—helping characterize the paradoxical but mutually reinforcing relationship between virtue and victimhood.
Although this essay, in part, concerns the singular rhetorical peculiarities of the early Trump presidency, I suggest that we are witnessing a much more signiﬁcant transformation in modes of political
address that account for the culture of spectatorship to which Trump
seems attuned. His indulgence in cruelty, revenge, and victimhood are
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in sync with the melodramatic norms of reality television and the vitriolic media ecology of social networking. As Ott and Dickinson argue,
Trump’s manner of address, particularly his appeals to white rage, are
well-suited to mediums that engender impulsivity, simplicity, narcissism, and incivility.40 As I illustrate in the following section, Trump’s
rallies carry the warped sense of civic virtue cultivated by reality television and social networks into the oﬃce of the presidency. Trump
addresses an electorate already accustomed to such perverse norms.
But ressentiment is not only a timely theory, it is also one that addresses the perennial concerns of rhetorical theorists that traces back
to Plato’s critique of rhetoric as merely a speaker’s knack for creating
pleasing appearances, capitalizing on mercurial emotions, and playing
demagogue with neither expert knowledge of nor concern for truth.
Thus, I conclude that ressentiment oﬀers rhetorical theory an account
of how dominant groups contain progressive expansions of public morality by debasing the very concept of civic virtue itself.
The man of ressentiment
In what follows, I analyze the agonistic drama that unfolds in
Trump’s address to his supporters, attending to the way he repeatedly chains out fantasies of persecution that ennoble both him and his
audience. I note throughout a series of value inversions, haphazard
and poorly-planned objectives, and undefeatable enemies that render
Trump and his supporters virtuous suﬀers, entitled to their revenge.
Yet, I conclude that this underlying psychical structure of ressentiment ultimately disempowers his audience by extorting from them
a perpetual deferral of agency to one man: Trump, their surrogate.
President Trump’s post-election rallies are spectacular, emotionallycharged events. Large amphitheaters and jubilant crowds recreate the
atmosphere of a rock concert, a wrestling match, or music festival. Enthusiastic supporters don all manner of Trump-themed merchandise
and clothing items, including the now iconic “Make American Great
Again” red trucker-style hats. The presence of the press and cameras
conveys the sense that these are singular newsworthy events. Introduced by theme music, Trump takes the stage. A carefully curated audience is arranged behind the president to enable the cameras to capture audience member’s emotional reactions to Trump’s transgressive
comments.
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Despite the celebration, the president’s rallies are also oddly ambivalent events. On the one hand, they are epideictic occasions in which
Trump recounts his many victories and accolades while also praising the virtues of his supporters—namely their loyalty. On the other,
Trump also ruminates on the ways he and his supporters have been
treated unfairly, warns of potential victimization around every turn,
searches out antagonisms and roadblocks, re-litigates old feuds, holds
grudges, invents powerful enemies, and fantasizes about committing
acts of cruelty. Though his rallies generate an extraordinary amount
of text, the themes throughout seldom vary. Examining a selection of
post-election rallies helps illustrate how Trump is able to continually
addle his audience into understanding themselves as at once powerful
and victimized. It is at his rallies where Trump commiserates with his
loyal supporters and delivers to them an understanding of their subject position as embattled. His proclamations of victory are subdued
by undertones of both personal and collective frustration.
Trump’s pain, or the suﬀerer-in-chief
Although he regularly observes the suﬀering of his forgotten electorate, according to Trump no one suﬀers more than he. Even when
responding to national tragedies or crises, Trump is quick to remind
his supporters of his martyrdom. For instance, following a statement
addressing assassination attempts against highly-visible Democrats,
Trump used the occasion to point out that no one is more maligned
than himself. Speaking at the White House to attendees at Turning
Point USA’s Young Black Leadership Summit, Trump concluded his
oﬃcial remarks with a series of oﬀ-the-cuﬀ and out-of-place statements that are characteristic of his political free verse.41 Most strikingly, he told the group, “[w]e all get attacked … Who gets attacked
more than me? … I can do the greatest thing for our country, and on
the networks, it will play bad.”42 This short aside illustrates how Trump
uses public controversies and moments of national grieving as occasions to reﬂect on the ways in which he has been wronged. Defying the
collective demands of the epideictic, Trump’s frequently centers himself above the occasion. He monopolizes grief—turning himself into a
synecdoche for the elisions and perceived insults faced by his supporters. He also levels and equivocates slights by the media and his political
opponents with the systematic discrimination faced by women, people
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of color, and GLTBQ communities. His use of the pronoun “we” could
mean a sense in which attacks are a part of our universal vulnerability, or it could infer a particularity that he believes he shares with his
African American audience. In either case, victimhood is robbed of its
material referents and reduced to a therapeutic discourse used to articulate and refract white suﬀering through the prism of identity politics. Finally, Trump presents himself as somewhat agentless in relation to his most frequently referenced enemy: the news media, or in
his words, the “fake news.” He asserts that despite his nation-saving
agenda, the press will never give him his fair due. They are a relentless and omnipotent entity that continues to victimize both him and
his supporters. Trump articulates his struggle as both commensurate
with other forms of structural inequality and unending because his enemies are bent on portraying him in a negative light.
Trump often searches out the suﬀering of others with whom he can
analogize his own victimization—maligned ﬁgures such as Joe Arpaio,
Admiral Ronny Jackson, and Brett Kavanaugh to name a few. In reference to the aggressive public vetting of Admiral Jackson for the head
of the Department of Veterans Aﬀairs, Trump opined, One of the saddest things I’ve seen is when Jon Tester and what he did to a great,
great man, Admiral Ronnie Jackson. Admiral Jackson was subjected
to horrible lies and smears. Now, I’m, you know, a victim of that, too,
but I’m sort of getting used to it.43
At a rally in Mississippi, Trump devoted a signiﬁcant amount of
time to the parallels between his own struggles and the so-called false
accusations of sexual assault leveled against then Supreme Court Nominee Justice Brett Kavanaugh. He implored, think of your son. Think
of your husband. Think – I’ve had many false accusations. I’ve had it
all the – I’ve had so many – and when I say it didn’t happen, nobody
believes me. But it’s me. It’s my job description.44
After establishing the similarity between the way both were treated
by the press and Democrats, Trump goes on to describe Kavanaugh as
an innocent victim and his accuser Professor Christine Blasely Ford as
a suspect. He remarked, “This woman had no clue what was going on.
No clue. And yet she made the most horrible charges against a number one in his class at Yale, perfect human being, great father, great
husband. This is a great person.”45 For Trump, the injustices that elevate to his attention frequently involve accomplished or privileged
people, such as himself, who have been unfairly treated.
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Trump expresses empathy with individuals such as Jackson and Kavanaugh because they are fallen public ﬁgures whose innocence and
powerlessness he believes reﬂect his own. He suggests that he knows,
too, what it is like to be treated unfairly. He asks the audience to think
of him the way they would other important men in their lives: their
sons, brothers, fathers, and now president. Imagine, he implores, what
it is like to be him— not what it is like to be a victim of sexual assault.
But for Trump, precarity and unfair treatment do not reference experiences of structural oppression but instead moments when the entitlements and privileges of a “great man” and a “perfect human being” are put at risk by entering the public eye. This explains how and
why Trump diverts attention from the claims of the aggrieved to focus on the suﬀering of the accused. If, as Isocrates warned, the outside world is aﬄicting with animus toward the elite, then those at the
top have the most to fear.46 Since he invites his audience to consider
the position of the accuser as a subject always-already infused with
resentment, he casts doubt on their claims to victimhood. It is no coincidence that the only public apology he has ever issued was to Justice Kavanaugh: “On behalf of our nation, I want to apologize to Brett
and the entire Kavanaugh family for the terrible pain and suﬀering
you have been forced to endure.”47 For Trump, only the claims of the
accused carry weight. In this way, Trump helps himself and his supporters corner the market on innocence.
It is important to note that he concludes each of these examples
with a common lament that these false attacks are ultimately his cross
to bear. In other words, Trump relates to these cases not only because
they were his nominees but, by his own estimation, they have been
cast as scapegoats by the left. To counter their unrelenting assault on
his administration, Trump identiﬁes himself as a martyr, a strong and
valiant character who will bear the load for others. Observing how the
press used to adore him, he claims, [t]hey used to treat me so good
too, until I ran for oﬃce. I used to get the greatest publicity. A friend
of mine said, “You know, you used to be the king of getting great publicity. What happened?” I said, “Well, I have some views that they’re
opposed to for a lot of bad reasons.”48
Not surprisingly, Trump reads bad press as an expression of selfinterested political cynicism. Elsewhere he noted, “On the way over
here, I saw a liberal pundit. He was ﬁlled with anger. And he was attacking me and our great administration. We have great people. I’ll
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tell you, the White House is really working good.” 49 His response to
criticism is often incredulous. He expresses surprise and dismay that
the press would deny and detract from the good work he believes is
being done by his administration. Here lies a remarkable similarity
between bad press coverage and his empathy with the accused: that
much like allegations of wrongdoing, criticism of his administration
is itself a denial of due process. Hence, he often adopts a perpetrator’s
perspective on social justice.
Despite the purported unfairness of his opponents’ criticism, Trump
oﬀers to take the blows for supporters. Trump routinely posits that he
can withstand an extraordinary amount of abuse. Calling himself and
his supporters “warriors” he suggests that warriors can take abuse:
There’s another warrior in the room. These are warriors. Look, the
abuse they take, the abuse we all take, if you’re not a warrior, you just
go home, go to the corner, put your thumb in your mouth and say,
“Mommy, take me home.”50
Illustrated here, Trump often characterizes his masculinity in abject terms. Put diﬀerently, he embodies a form of masculinity that is
valorized for its capacity to suﬀer.51 Warriors enjoy their suﬀering because it is a mark of virtue and stoic pride, as opposed to the emasculated man who sucks his thumb and cries to his mother. According
to Trump, only he can save his supporters through a noble sacriﬁce.
In his RNC address he portrayed himself as a benevolent protector,
motivated not by his own political interests but “so that the powerful
can no longer beat up on people that cannot defend themselves.”52 In
defense of his statement addressing the violence at Charlottesville in
2017, he asserted that “[t]he media can attack me. But where I draw
the line is when they attack you, which is what they do. When they
attack the decency of our supporters.”53 In addition to the overt disavowal of responsibility for the racist violence on display at the Unite
the Right rally, Trump represented himself as a benevolent protector
of the virtuous citizenry against the bad faith of their opponents. In
short, he inscribed martyrdom onto the “ ” of the presidency.
Embracing the cultural logics of white male sacriﬁce enables Trump
to address his audience as traumatized subjects who can be redeemed
and made whole again through ritual victim age. Indeed, Kenneth
Burke’s description of cycles of guilt, victim age, sacriﬁce, and redemption would suggest that Trump’s rhetoric symbolically excises
evil and imperfection via ritual puriﬁcation.54 More speciﬁcally, we
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might also understand how this rhetorical choice foregrounds the
white male body in pain as the exemplar citizen-subject. Thus, the
staging of Trump’s pain, to use Claire Sisco King’s words, constitutes
a “restaging traumatic loss so that catastrophe may be reﬁgured as redemption, renewal, and rebirth.”55 In other words, Trump reconﬁgures
suﬀering and victimhood as exemplars of virtuous leadership and the
performance of which entitles he and his supporters to something
more grandiose than their present circumstances.
A ﬁtting example of this sacriﬁcial logic is in how Trump addresses the #MeToo movement. In his remarks about false allegations, he expressed righteous indignation about what he considers
to be a superlative inversion of due process. For him, the catastrophe is that virtuous subjects might be stripped of their privileges
and social entitlements. The accusations against Kavanaugh, a “perfect human being,” he argues, “violates every notion of fairness, decency, and due process.”56 When discussing Kavanaugh at his rallies,
he often employs terms that prompt the audience to think of him as
vulnerable, weak, and feminized. Kavanaugh’s victimhood is both
exempliﬁed and ampliﬁed by the collateral damage inﬂicted on his
wife and daughter. For instance, Trump claims that “a man’s life is
in tatters. A man’s life is shattered. His wife is shattered. His daughters, who are beautiful, incredible young kids—they destroy people.
They want to destroy people. These are really evil people.”57 Kavanaugh and his family are traumatic subjects par excellence; “perfect”
and “beautiful” people “shattered,” “tattered,” and “destroyed” by
the left. Discussing Kavanaugh in relation to feminine ﬁgures such
as his wife and daughters exaggerates his innocence and precarity
while also making out Blasey Ford and the press to be the real predators. He goes on to argue that:
Guilty until proven innocent. That’s very dangerous for our country. And I have it myself all the time. But for me, it’s like a part of
the job description. Let it happen to me. Shouldn’t happen to him.
Shouldn’t happen to him.58

Such statements are illustrative of how Trump establishes his quasireligious moral character. In one sense, he suggests that his primary
virtue is sacriﬁce. Yet, this statement also exempliﬁes Trump’s inversion of the collective good.
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In Trump’s rhetoric, it is his pain and his struggles that ultimately
matter. It is for this reason that Trump’s rhetoric is primarily concerned with a self-serving conception of justice. He is preoccupied
with the vulnerability of privileged people who have much to lose,
not, for instance, the virtues of precarious communities victimized by
sexual assault and harassment, domestic abuse, mass incarceration,
police brutality, or discrimination by the judicial system. Second, despite all the institutional and ﬁnancial advantages at his call, Trump
suggests that he is as much a victim of false accusations and unfair
treatment as anyone else, regardless of material circumstances. In
this case, being accused of wrongdoing is commensurate with being
victimized by wrongdoing. Finally, he oﬀers himself up as a sacriﬁce
on behalf of his beleaguered supporters. This pattern of victimization
and sacriﬁce invites his audience to identify as survivors of cultural
trauma who are redeemed through Trump’s martyrdom. Of course,
the biggest victim in any national tragedy is himself. But Trump presents his own suﬀering as unique and unable to be fully relayed to his
supporters. When addressing criticisms of his immigration policy, he
notes:
And think of it in terms of immigration. And you may love it, or
you may say, isn’t that terrible. Okay? And if you say isn’t that terrible, who cares? Because the way they treat me – that’s peanuts
compared to the way they treat me. Okay?59

This lament suggests that Trump’s woes extend well beyond what is
visible to his supporters. Fortunately for them, Trump assures, he has
an extraordinary capacity to withstand pain.
If ressentiment is characterized by feelings of powerlessness and
ineﬀability, then no one act of redemption can dissipate powerful
emotions such as hate and envy. Indeed, Trump’s sacriﬁce is unending because his victimhood is predicated on the relentlessness of an
undefeatable foe. As the above examples illustrate, Trump suggests
that no matter what he does the enemy attacks. This represents the
ambivalence of ressentiment: one must continually re-experience
humiliations over and over again to build a reservoir of anger. Although Trump boasts about his victories, he must constantly unsettle his audience’s sense of contentment. He must present himself as
hamstrung, foiled and powerless so that resentment may transform
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into a wellspring of intense frustration directed at Trump’s opponents.
Trump is able to maintain his electorate’s political exile by constructing an array of evasive and cunning foes. Despite a conservative majority in all three branches of government during the ﬁrst two
years of his presidency, Trump consistently represents himself and
his supporters as a fragile and tenuous minority. The power of his enemies is unseen, conspiratorial, and elusive. For instance, he argues
that “they’re the old and corrupt, globalist, ruling class that squandered trillions of dollars on foreign adventures.”60 In another excerpt,
Trump exclaims that “Today’s Democrat Party is held hostage by leftwing haters, angry mobs, deep state radicals, establishment cronies,
and their fake news allies. Our biggest obstacle and their greatest ally
actually is the media.”61 In one of his more explicit nods to right-wing
conspiracy theories, Trump references the threat of “Unelected deepstate operatives who defy the voters to push their own secret agendas [who] are truly a threat to democracy itself.”62 In another passage
worth quoting at length, he claims:
But it’s all fragile. The Democrats will open our borders to deadly
drugs and ruthless gangs … Radical Democrats want to tear down
our laws, tear down our institutions in pursuit of power, demolish
our prosperity in the name of socialism and probably worse … and
abolish our borders in the service of globalism. There is nothing
Democrats aren’t willing to do, and you’re seeing it day by day, and
you’ve seen it more the last week than you’ve ever seen it before.
And no one – just think of this. No one under any circumstances
is allowed to speak up if you’re on this side of the equation. But
guess what? We’re speaking up like nobody has ever spoken up
before. They want to get the power that they so desperately crave
that was taken away from them. All of the Democrats know and
all they really know how to do is obstruct, resist, demolish, destroy and delay.63

These examples illuminate the characteristics of Trump’s undefeatable foe. First, the Democrats and the press are part of a “ruling class”
that extracts wealth from his supporters to bolster a corrupt regime
of power. Although Trump rarely misses an opportunity to brag about
his aﬄuence, he relates to class not as if it were one’s position within
a spectrum of wealth stratiﬁcation but rather as a style or point of
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identiﬁcation. This allows Trump to tout his successes while simultaneously lambasting his “elite” tormentors. For instance, when discussing his superior intelligence and educational background relative
to the press, Trump vaunts “I have a better education than they do
from a much better school, but—the elite. They’re the elite. They’re
the elite.”64 He inverts terms such as “ruling class” and “elite” to reference not self-proclaimed billionaires such as himself but instead an
abstract group of invisible power brokers allied with the media and
hell bent on promoting “globalist” interests. Constant victories aside,
he encourages his audience to not underestimate the power of the enemy. Instead of belittling the weakness of the minority party, he suggests that their networks of power are global in scope. References to
“globalism” suggest a vast international conspiracy to make the United
States subject to world government.65
Second, these enemies are addled by irrational hatred, anger, and
radicalism. Hence, they will not be hamstrung by existing institutions
and the rule of law. He draws on terms such as “deep state radicals”
and “obstructionists” to construct his electorate as virtuous outsiders
who, being uncorrupted by the system, must remain vigilant against
a camouﬂaged yet powerful adversary. This helps reconcile his audience’s outsider identity and keep alive an enemy at which he can continually direct their anger. Finally, he suggests that he and his virtuous
supporters have been silenced by the opposition. An indirect reference
to the lightening rod of “political correctness,” Trump contends that
these enemies lack civic virtue because they do not respect the basic
tenets of free speech, the rule of law, and democratic decision-making.
In this way, Trump eﬀectively projects onto his adversaries the very
attributes the press has characterized his own administration. Moreover, he eﬀectively disavows his own power and status while crafting
an adversary worthy of his audience’s ire.
Trump’s revenge, or the avenger-in-chief
Trump claims to feel his audience’s pain. In his inaugural address,
he envisioned America as a nation under siege by foreign enemies,
citizens robbed of their dignity, and mothers and children suﬀering
needlessly. His address was geared toward those who saw themselves
as downtrodden, forgotten, and hopeless:
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Mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities,
rusted-out factories, scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation, an education system ﬂush with cash, but,
which leaves our young and beautiful students deprived of knowledge, and the crime, and the gangs, and the drugs that have stolen too many lives and robbed our country of so much unrealized
potential. This American carnage stops right here and stops right
now. We are one nation and their pain is our pain. Their dreams
are our dreams and their success will be our success. We share one
heart, one home, and one glorious destiny.66

Here, the nation is uniﬁed by shared traumas. His description of
“American carnage” imports the pain of others into the nation’s “glorious destiny.” Trump not only speaks to the felt pain of his audience,
he socializes and circulates these negative aﬀects into public life. The
particular and visceral pain of an unemployed coal miner, then, can
become the vicarious sympathy pain of his more-well-oﬀ electorate.
He appropriates the pain of the most vulnerable among his electorate
to justify policies that will likely result in their further impoverishment. This is pain detached from particular bodies, rendered an abstract idea that on its own can generate great anger amongst a more
universal audience. Here, Trump channels that suﬀering into an imagined political community. Many in Trump’s electorate may not be the
forgotten; nonetheless, they are entitled to the indignation that accompanies the injuries of others.
As I note earlier, several scholars have addressed Trump’s victimized audience. Indeed, the above example is illustrative of Trump’s
eﬀorts to address Americans as oppressed and mistreated—not by
structural racism, gender inequality, or class exploitation—but by foreign Others: immigrants, MS-13, China, “globalists,” and Islamic terrorists. To elaborate instead on his rhetoric of ressentiment, I wish to
pause on the place of revenge and retributive justice in Trump’s emotional-moral framework. Put another way, how do fantasies of revenge both sustain the charge of anger while also rendering his audience mute and powerless? At the 2018 Conservative Political Action
Conference, Trump stated plainly his approach to justice. Simply put,
“[p]eople that treat us badly, we treat them much worse than they
could ever imagine. That’s the way it has to be. That’s the way it has
to be.”67 At his rallies, Trump typically meanders through a list of enemies—old and new—and chains out fantasies of retribution. But the
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revenge he calls for need not serve a particular end. Revisiting cruelty on others is its own reward. This circular moral reasoning of cruelty for cruelty’s sake never dissipates the animus that generates the
felt need for revenge. Revenge does not solve anything and it does not
need to. Revenge appeals work by acclimating audiences to violence
and relieving them of any guilt associated with enjoying or participating in acts of cruelty.
In some cases, Trump’s endorsement of retribution is overt. This is
particularly true when he addresses protestors at his rallies. At a 2016
rally in Las Vegas, he responded to a protestor being removed by asking, “Do you know what they used to do to guys like that when they’re
in a place like this? They’d be carried out on a stretcher, folks.” To the
crowd’s delight, he later added “I’d like to punch him in the face, I tell
ya.”68 When a protestor at another event yelled “Black Lives Matter”
he pined nostalgically that, you know, in the old days — which isn’t
so long ago — when we were less politically correct, that kind of stuﬀ
wouldn’t have happened. Today we have to be so nice, so nice, we always have to be so nice.69
At another rally he urged his audience to “knock the crap out of
him … I promise you, I will pay your legal fees.”70 The problem of dissent, he surmised, was that there were no consequences for protestors
because “no one wants to hurt each other anymore.”71 In one sense,
Trump clearly transgresses taboos against the open endorsement of
political violence in a democratic culture. He carves out a zone of exception for his supporters that relieves them of their legal and civic
obligations. Under exception, slights and injuries—even ones of little consequence—can and should be met with an equal if not disproportionate measure of retributive violence. Read through the concept
of ressentiment, such statements also illustrate the inner workings
of a reactive morality, formed in the negative that is so hollow that
its animosity can never be satisﬁed. In other words, this articulation
of revenge is neither eﬃcacious nor proportional. Revenge is simply
morally correct: cruelty is for its own sake. Writing for The Atlantic,
Adam Serwer argued that what Trump’s cruelty does achieve is the
binding together of his electorate in the collective enjoyment of others suﬀering. He writes that “it is not just that the perpetrators of
this cruelty enjoy it; it is that they enjoy it with one another. Their
shared laughter at the suﬀering of others is an adhesive that binds
them to one another, and to Trump.”72 Indeed, the crowd responds
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with cathartic laughter as Trump releases them from the burdens of
empathy and cultivates aﬀective bonds based on the shared enjoyment of other people’s pain. The function of cruelty, then, is less instrumental than it is constitutive.
It is not simply that Trump demands retribution for injuries committed against him and his electorate—to be sure, he does—but that
he contorts revenge into a civic virtue. Thus, Trump inverts the Quintilian virtues of the “good [person] speaking well” by elevating the
wronged person claiming their right to revenge. He heralds violence
over paciﬁsm; enmity over respect; competition over cooperation;
hyperbole over truth; and bad faith over good will. Indeed, as Scheler warns, the man of ressentiment … wreaks vengeance on the idea
whose test he cannot stand by pulling it down to the level of his factual condition. Thus his awareness of sin and nothingness explodes
the beautiful structure of the world of values, debasing the idea for
the sake of an illusory cure.73
As such, in Trump’s upturn of democratic virtue, the nation is great
not for its compassion but its extraordinary capacity to inﬂict pain on
its enemies. Particularly when discussing immigration, Trump touts
his administration’s use of violence against criminal gangs. He observes that “We are dismantling and destroying the bloodthirsty criminal gangs, and well, I will just tell you in, we’re not doing it in a politically correct fashion. We’re doing it rough. Our guys are rougher than
their guys.”74 Here, Trump extends the concept of political correctness
beyond the constraints of appropriate and inclusive language to include formal prohibitions against the use of excessive force and violations of due process. “Doing it rough,” as it were, means “destroying”
the nation’s enemies by dispensing with burdensome rules governing
the fair treatment of immigrants and criminal suspects.
Whereas previous Republican presidents praised American exceptionalism (problematically so) as a beacon of hope to the rest of the
world, Trump’s America is exceptional because it is above the law,
tougher and rougher than any potential rival. But he did not stop
there. Trump continued by telling an anecdote in which he asked a
general to describe for him the toughness of ICE. He recalled, I asked
one of our great generals, “how tough are our people? How tough are
they?” He said, “sir, you don’t want to know about it.” Then I saw one
guy come out, a customs oﬃcer who is a monster. I said, “so general,
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you think I could take that guy in a ﬁght?” He said, “Mr. President, sir
I don’t even want to think about it.” I said “you’re right, actually.”75
For Trump, it is this unimaginable capacity to inﬂict pain that is
the nation’s greatest asset. His calls for revenge are also constructed
in terms associated with physical toil and domination. For example,
he emphasized law enforcement’s enhanced ability to use excessive
force: ICE, we call ICE, and they go into those towns, and they grab
those guys by the neck and they throw them into those paddy wagons. They couldn’t care less. And you don’t want to do it. And you don’t
want to do it.76
Elsewhere he bragged that we are throwing MS-13 the hell out of
“here so fast” and that “General Kelly’s great people … come in and
grab the thugs and throw them the hell out.”77 These tales of excessive force enable his audience to imagine having power over foreign
Others, or to render the nation’s enemies helpless and physically submissive to a more dominant and masculine power. He praises neither
restraint nor respect for life but rather our monstrous capability to
exceed the cruelty of others.
Perhaps the most palpable revenge fantasies involve Trump’s electoral opponent Hillary Clinton. At his rallies, mere mention of “crooked
Hillary” prompts reﬂexive jeers and chants of the slogan “Lock Her
Up!” In yet another inversion of democratic norms, Trump has routinely called for the jailing of his political opponent: “Hillary Clinton
has to go to jail. She has to go to jail.”78 During a presidential debate
he claimed, “If I win, I am going to instruct my attorney general to
get a special prosecutor to look into your situation. There has never
been so many lies, deception—there has never been anything like it.”79
Elsewhere he noted that his supporters demand it, “When I go out
and speak, the people of this country are furious. In my opinion, the
people who have been long-term workers at the FBI are furious.”80
Read in light of Trump’s masculinized calls for meanness and toughness as virtues, the call to “lock her up” constitutes a particularly lurid fantasy of feminine submission. The demand envisions Clinton as
a domineering shrew rendered helpless and vulnerable to the physical coercion of a resurgent masculine public. Indeed, Trump is fond
of recalling the pleasure of besting his female opponent. At one rally
he recalls, “That felt good. Pretty recently. Okay. Now I have the privilege of going against crooked Hillary Clinton. So I beat, I beat crooked
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Hillary.”81 The thought of beating or jailing Clinton channels feelings
of outrage into a concrete fantasy of control over a superlatively evil
and cunning opponent.
But, with ressentiment, emotions are ultimately suppressed and
fantasies of revenge are perpetually deferred. Indeed, in Scheler’s
words, Trump’s rhetoric “cannot escape the tormenting conﬂict between desire and impotence.”82 Much like MS-13 or China, Clinton
constitutes an impassable obstacle, an undefeatable foe whose presence conﬁrms the existence of a hostile external world. Hence, Trump
paradoxically suggests that he is also powerless to defeat her. Noting
how the media ignores his pleas to investigate her crimes, he explains
“You can have the biggest story about Hillary Clinton—I mean, look
at what she’s getting away with. But let’s see if she gets away with
it. Let’s see.”83 Although he has asserted elsewhere that he would imprison Hillary, here he oddly suggests a more passive wait-and-see
approach. But he explains that it is his power that ironically prevents
him from delivering the ﬁnal blow:
The saddest thing is, because I’m the president of the United
States, I am not supposed to be involved in the Justice Department. I am not supposed to be involved in the FBI … I’m not supposed to be doing the kind of things that I would love to be doing
and I’m very frustrated by it.84

Trump’s calls for retribution against Clinton are powerful because
they can never be fully satisﬁed. In one sense, jailing Clinton would
dissipate the enjoyment of calling for her to be jailed. As Scheler reminds us, such criticism “does not want to cure the evil: the evil is
merely a pretext for criticism.”85 Moreover, Trump’s inability to carry
out his audience’s desire for revenge helps aggregate frustration and
indignation so as to keep anger in constant circulation. Ressentiment
arises when emotions are powerful but must be suppressed because
they cannot be acted upon. In this case, Trump cultivates hostile emotions that give rise to the desire for vengeance but without providing
his audience with a sense of resolution or power to act on their felt
intensities. Yet, this is exactly the point: the felt need for vengeance
never dissipates and the list of hostile enemies and tormentors grows
without end.

C . R . K e l ly i n Q u a r t e r ly J o u r n a l o f S p e e c h 1 0 6 ( 2 0 2 0 )

25

The age of ressentiment
This essay argues that a theory of ressentiment illustrates how the
contemporary rhetoric of white victimhood has cultivated an aﬀective
political environment wherein rage is a renewable rhetorical resource.
President Trump’s appeals to suﬀering and revenge reach beyond the
politics of resentment, which can be both mercurial and ﬂeeting, to a
politics of ressentiment that hails a subject addled by feelings of anger and powerlessness. Ressentiment represents an emotional-moral
framework that sustains an audience’s desire for vengeance but also
an investment in their own marginalization. Although Trump attempts to cultivate ressentiment, this does mean that he is ineﬀective
in achieving policy victories or selling his agenda to his electorate. In
fact, quite the opposite. Invective, negation, and detraction are powerful tropes that enable their user to undermine taken-for-granted virtues and create new and self-serving standards of moral judgment. Indeed, while a theory of ressentiment explains that perverse appeal of
Trump’s rhetoric, the motives of Trump supporters seem to confound
the press.86 Perplexed by his transgressive behavior, their incredulous
response to his perversity continues to be “this is not normal!” To a
certain extent, they are correct. Trump has not only unhinged his supporters from civil obligation, he has inverted the very concept of civic
virtue itself. It should come as no surprise, then, that when Trump decries his victimhood and calls for vengeance against his enemies that
his supporters remain enthusiastic.
As Gunn has suggested, rhetoricians should attend to the structures
of enjoyment that maintain the aﬀective charge of Trump’s refusal
to obey civic conventions.87 Along these lines, I have argued that ressentiment illustrates some additional registers that help explain how
Trump is able to maintain his audience’s claim to marginality while
sustaining their anger at the very elite institutions he occupies. Moreover, ressentiment explains the rhetorical work of Trump’s embrace
of the profane, the taboo, and the unvirtuous. Reading Trump’s rhetoric through the theory of ressentiment explains the rhetorical implications of when prolonged frustration, envy, and vengeance meet
powerful sentiments of victimhood and powerlessness. Ressentiment
keeps its audience’s attention and hatred focused on an external world
that is hostile to their interests and values.
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Though his rhetoric of suﬀering and revenge successfully aggregates anger to legitimize his actions and cultivate support, this essay suggests that he ultimately renders his audience powerless. First,
in adopting the role of suﬀering martyr, Trump becomes a transcendent ﬁgure whose sacriﬁce oﬀers his audience an illusory sense of
redemption and wholeness. Yet, the emotional-moral framework he
oﬀers permits no one act to erase the desire for vengeance. Moreover, there was never a time in which his predominantly white supporters were ever whole. Although he oﬀers to suﬀer in the name of
his electorate, his suﬀering is ultimately self-empowerment. He socializes and circulates the pain of others so that it is accessible and
useable to his aﬄuent electorate. It becomes his pain and his struggles that take precedence over all else, and by his estimation no one
suﬀers more than he.
Second, hailed as perpetually slighted and ignored, Trump locates
in his audience their virtue as passive marginalized subjects. He emphasizes how they are forgotten, demoralized, attacked, and dispossessed of their birth rights. It is for these reasons that they are entitled to their revenge. Although Trump continually erects new barriers
to achieving their goals and locates new enemies to blame for their
circumstances, this does not prevent his supporters from pursuing
victory by their own means. Ressentiment cultivates political powerlessness but does not preclude individual acts of vengeance. The 2018
attempted bombings directed at prominent Democrats is a case-inpoint. Trump-supporter Cesar Sayoc allegedly sent improvised explosive devices to a group of enemies frequently referenced by Trump at
his rallies, including Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Eric
Holder, and George Soros.88 As Engels notes, the constant sowing of
discontent has dangerous consequences. It can test the ability of democratic culture to channel resentment into the productive indignation
toward inequality. Ressentiment encourages individuals to divest from
the civic good and ennoble their own suﬀering, however mundane or
contrived. Ressentiment prevents subjects from moving forward because their gaze is cast backward toward re-experiencing an injury.
Trump directs his audience’s anger toward settling old scores, litigating past wrongs, and resurrecting new enemies. In the case of Trump’s
audience, the collective injury is those social and economic changes
that have supposedly displaced white America. He creates a political
community forged through and invested in its own marginalization.
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Trump’s appeals to victimhood and revenge exempliﬁes how ressentiment acts as an anti-democratic and anti-progressive force. Ressentiment is the animating political force of this precarious political moment and will ultimately test the elasticity of democratic culture to
contain and channel the forces of resentment.
Finally, this essay suggests that the rhetoric of ressentiment is a
unique defense mechanism that undermines civic virtue to stiﬂe the
continued expansion of public morality to include historically marginalized groups. The present age of ressentiment gives new resonance to Celeste Condit’s 1987 essay “Crafting Virtue,” in which she
made a compelling case for a rhetorical concept of public morality
that is perpetually crafted through collective deliberation rather than
private and unchanging universals.89 Condit explained that where a
private sense of morality cannot account for the need for progress,
public morality recognizes human capacity to transform exclusionary moral codes thought to be timeless and objective. Condit avers
that if morality were simply a private concern, the collective moral
order would never have been forced to account for either the humanity of people of color or the violence carried out in its name. In short,
such a perverse moral order would be impervious to change because
it would, by deﬁnition, already be perfect. As ressentiment nests itself into public life its eﬀect is to interrupt, if not reverse, the continued evolution of public morality. Ressentiment does so by inverting
the civic good so as to privilege negative emotions such as jealousy
and envy that tear at the fabric of moral systems designed to protect
against the selﬁsh maximization of self-interest. As Condit argued,
to the extent that dominant elites control the means of communication and the public vocabulary, they can represent singular partisan interests as universal or moral ones. They can thereby evade the
modiﬁcations, compromises, and larger goods wrought through agonistic competition between values and interests. Dominant elites thus
hijack the moral potential for partisan ends.90
A theory of ressentiment not only corroborates how public morality is seized for private gain but also illustrates how civic virtue itself
might be simply rendered undesirable by those who are incapable or
unwilling to live by its dictates.
Ressentiment stands against the improvement of public morality
and those who it enraptures are relieved of their moral duties to others. Ressentiment names the debasement of public morality that is
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the very ethical foundation of rhetorical practice. It represents rhetoric as its most demeaning caricature: self-serving, emotionally overwrought, and unconcerned with truth or ethics. Ressentiment oﬀers
rhetorical theory a diagnostic for the moral and emotional deﬁlement
of the public that from time-to-time imperils democracies. Where resentment is a discrete and short-lived phenomenon which democracy
is sometimes equipped to address, ressentiment bespeaks the perverse
emotional and moral attachment to superﬁcial injuries that democratic institutions cannot remedy. Ressentiment, then, makes sense
of how dominant groups reign in progressive forces that might challenge their status by evacuating civic virtue of meaning and replacing
it with a self-serving imitation of the good.
It is important to note that though Trump’s voice is the shrillest,
he is neither aberration nor originator. Ressentiment is a cultural miasma, a feature of public life in which the aﬀective charge of rage and
envy underwrites participation in the polity more so than empathy
and virtue. Thus, journalist Jeremy Peters has observed a number of
political candidates who have begun to mimic Trump’s style.91 For instance, West Virginia Senate candidate Don Blankenship aggressively
touted calls to jail Trump’s political opponents. Georgia gubernatorial candidate Michael Williams drove a self-dubbed “deportation bus”
around the state while Governor Brian Kemp ran an ad in which he
bragged that he owned a truck “in case I need to round up criminal illegals and take them home myself.”92 In the 2018 midterm elections, some Republican candidates capitalized on a deep reservoir of
public anger and animosity by calling for violent mass deportations,
glorifying violence and toughness, mocking and insulting political opponents, and demanding unﬂinching loyalty to the president.93 These
mimicries illustrate that while Trump is a powerful articulator, the
rhetoric of ressentiment has become an eﬀective conduit for anyone
wishing to channel alienation into political projects premised on cruelty, revenge, and noble suﬀering. In this age of ressentiment it is easier to debase civic virtue, blame racial Others, fantasize about violence
and revenge, and wallow in self-pity than it is to live up to the lofty
democratic ideals to which the nation nominally aspires.
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